American Injustice - Lying Judges and Lawyers

Prosecutor's Immunity
IMBLER
vs.
PACHTMAN, DISTRICT ATTORNEY
No. 74-5435.
SUPREME COURT OF THE UNITED STATES
424 U.S. 409, 96 S. Ct. 984, 47 L. Ed. 2d 128
March 2, 1976
SYLLABUS

Petitioner, convicted of murder, unsuccessfully petitioned for state habeas corpus on the basis of respondent prosecuting attorney's revelation of newly discovered evidence, and charged that respondent had knowingly used false testimony and suppressed material evidence at petitioner's trial. Petitioner thereafter filed a federal habeas corpus petition based on the same allegations, and ultimately obtained his release. He then brought an action against respondent and others under 42 U.S.C. § 1983, seeking damages for loss of liberty allegedly caused by unlawful prosecution, but the District Court held that respondent was immune from liability under § 1983, and the Court of Appeals affirmed. Held: A state prosecuting attorney who, as here, acted within the scope of his duties in initiating and pursuing a criminal prosecution and in presenting the State's case, is absolutely immune from a civil suit for damages under § 1983 for alleged deprivations of the accused's constitutional rights. Pp. 417-431.

(a) Section 1983 is to be read in harmony with general principles of tort immunities and defenses rather than in derogation of them. Tenney v. Brandhove, 341 U.S. 367. Pp. 417-419.

(b) The same considerations of public policy that underlie the common-law rule of absolute immunity of a prosecutor from a suit for malicious prosecution likewise dictate absolute immunity under § 1983. Although such immunity leaves the genuinely wronged criminal defendant without civil redress against a prosecutor whose malicious or dishonest action deprives him of liberty, the alternative of qualifying a prosecutor's immunity would disserve the broader public interest in that it would prevent the vigorous and fearless performance of the prosecutor's duty that is essential to the proper functioning of the criminal justice system and would often prejudice criminal defendants by skewing post-conviction judicial decisions that should be made with the sole purpose of insuring justice. Pp. 420-428.

500 F.2d 1301, affirmed.
POWELL, J., delivered the opinion of the Court, in which BURGER, C. J., and STEWART, BLACKMUN, and REHNQUIST, JJ., joined. WHITE, J., filed an opinion concurring in the judgment, in which BRENNAN and MARSHALL, JJ., joined, post, p. 432. STEVENS, J., took no part in the consideration or decision of the case.

PRIORHIST

CERTIORARI TO THE UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS FOR THE NINTH CIRCUIT
COUNSEL
Roger S. Hanson argued the cause and filed a brief for petitioner.
John P. Farrell argued the cause for respondent. With him on the brief was John H. Larson.
Solicitor General Bork argued the cause for the United States as amicus curiae. With him on the brief were Acting Assistant Attorney General Keeney, Deputy Solicitor General Friedman, Harry R. Sachse, and Jerome M. Feit.*

AUTHOR: POWELL
OPINION
{*410} MR. JUSTICE POWELL delivered the opinion of the Court.
The question presented in this case is whether a state prosecuting attorney who acted within the scope of his duties in initiating and pursuing a criminal prosecution is amenable to suit under 42 U.S.C. § 1983 for alleged deprivations of the defendant's constitutional rights. The Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit held that he is not. 500 F.2d 1301. We affirm.

I
The events which culminated in this suit span many years and several judicial proceedings. They began in {*411} January 1961, when two men attempted to rob a Los Angeles market run by Morris Hasson. One shot and fatally wounded Hasson, and the two fled in different directions. Ten days later Leonard Lingo was killed while attempting a robbery in Pomona, Cal., but his two accomplices escaped. Paul Imbler, petitioner in this case, turned himself in the next day as one of those accomplices. Subsequent investigation led the Los Angeles District Attorney to believe that Imbler and Lingo had perpetrated the first crime as well, and that Imbler had killed Hasson. Imbler was charged with first-degree felony murder for Hasson's death.

The State's case consisted of eyewitness testimony from Hasson's wife and identification testimony from three men who had seen Hasson's assailants fleeing after the shooting. Mrs. Hasson was unable to identify the gunman because a hat had obscured his face, but from police photographs she identified the killer's companion as Leonard Lingo. The primary identification witness was Alfred Costello, a passerby on the night of the crime, who testified that he had a clear view both as the gunman emerged from the market and again a few moments later when the fleeing gunman -- after losing his hat -- turned to fire a shot at Costello1 and to shed his coat2 before continuing on. Costello positively identified Imbler as the gunman. The second identification witness, an attendant at a parking lot through which the gunman ultimately escaped, testified that he had a side and front view as the man passed. Finally, a customer who was leaving Hasson's market as the robbers entered {*412} testified that he had a good look then and as they exited moments later. All of these witnesses identified Imbler as the gunman, and the customer also identified the second man as Leonard Lingo. Rigorous cross-examination failed to shake any of these witnesses.3

Imbler's defense was an alibi. He claimed to have spent the night of the Hasson killing bar-hopping with several persons, and to have met Lingo for the first time the morning before the attempted robbery in Pomona. This testimony was corroborated by Mayes, the other accomplice in the Pomona robbery, who also claimed to have accompanied Imbler on the earlier rounds of the bars. The jury found Imbler guilty and fixed punishment at death.4 On appeal the Supreme Court of California affirmed unanimously over numerous contentions of error. People v. Imbler, 57 Cal. 2d 711, 371 P. 2d 304 (1962).

Shortly thereafter Deputy District Attorney Richard Pachtman, who had been the prosecutor at Imbler's trial and who is the respondent before this Court, wrote to the Governor of California describing evidence turned up after trial by himself and an investigator for the state correctional authority. In substance, the evidence consisted of newly discovered corroborating witnesses for Imbler's alibi, as well as new revelations about prime witness Costello's background which indicated that he was less trustworthy than he had represented originally to Pachtman and in his testimony. Pachtman noted that leads to some of this information had been available to Imbler's counsel prior to trial but apparently {*413} had not been developed, that Costello had testified convincingly and withstood intense cross-examination, and that none of the new evidence was conclusive of Imbler's innocence. He explained that he wrote from a belief that "a prosecuting attorney has a duty to be fair and see that all true facts, whether helpful to the case or not, should be presented."5

Imbler filed a state habeas corpus petition shortly after Pachtman's letter. The Supreme Court of California appointed one of its retired justices as referee to hold a hearing, at which Costello was the main attraction. He recanted his trial identification of Imbler, and it also was established that on cross-examination and redirect he had painted a picture of his own background that was more flattering than true. Imbler's corroborating witnesses, uncovered by prosecutor Pachtman's investigations, also testified.

In his brief to the Supreme Court of California on this habeas petition, Imbler's counsel described Pachtman's post-trial detective work as "[i]n the highest tradition of law enforcement and justice," and as a premier example of "devotion to duty."6 But he also charged that the prosecution had knowingly used false testimony and suppressed material evidence at Imbler's trial.7 In a thorough opinion by then Justice Traynor, the Supreme Court of California unanimously rejected these contentions and denied the writ. In re Imbler, {*414} 60 Cal. 2d 554, 387 P. 2d 6 (1963). The California court noted that the hearing record fully supported the referee's finding that Costello's recantation of his identification lacked credibility compared to the original identification itself, id., at 562, 387 P. 2d, at 10-11, and that the new corroborating witnesses who appeared on Imbler's behalf were unsure of their stories or were otherwise impeached, id., at 569-570, 387 P. 2d, at 14.

In 1964, the year after denial of his state habeas petition, Imbler succeeded in having his death sentence overturned on grounds unrelated to this case. In re Imbler, 61 Cal. 2d 556, 393 P. 2d 687 (1964). Rather than resentence him, the State stipulated to life imprisonment. There the matter lay for several years, until in late 1967 or early 1968 Imbler filed a habeas corpus petition in Federal District Court based on the same contentions previously urged upon and rejected by the Supreme Court of California.

The District Court held no hearing. Instead, it decided the petition upon the record, including Pachtman's letter to the Governor and the transcript of the referee's hearing ordered by the Supreme Court of California. Reading that record quite differently than had the seven justices of the State Supreme Court, the District Court found eight instances of state misconduct at Imbler's trial, the cumulative effect of which required issuance of the writ. Imbler v. Craven, 298 F. Supp. 795, 812 (CD Cal. 1969). Six occurred during Costello's testimony and amounted in the court's view to the culpable use by the prosecution of misleading or false testimony.8 The other two instances were suppressions of {*415} evidence favorable to Imbler by a police fingerprint expert who testified at trial and by the police who investigated Hasson's murder.9 The District Court ordered that the writ of habeas corpus issue unless California retried Imbler within 60 days, and denied a petition for rehearing.

The State appealed to the Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit, claiming that the District Court had failed to give appropriate deference to the factual determinations of the Supreme Court of California as required by 28 U.S.C. § 2254 (d). The Court of Appeals affirmed, finding that the District Court had merely "reached different conclusions than the state court in applying federal constitutional standards to [the] facts," Imbler v. California, 424 F.2d 631, 632, and certiorari was denied, 400 U.S. 865 (1970). California chose not to retry Imbler, and he was released.

At this point, after a decade of litigation and with Imbler now free, the stage was set forth present suit. In April 1972, Imbler filed a civil rights action, under 42 U.S.C. § 1983 and related statutes, against respondent Pachtman, the police fingerprint expert, and various other officers of the Los Angeles police force. He alleged {*416} that a conspiracy among them unlawfully to charge and convict him had caused him loss of liberty and other grievous injury. He demanded $2.7 million in actual and exemplary damages from each defendant, plus $15,000 attorney's fees.

Imbler attempted to incorporate into his complaint the District Court's decision granting the writ of habeas corpus, and for the most part tracked that court's opinion in setting out the overt acts in furtherance of the alleged conspiracy. The gravamen of his complaint against Pachtman was that he had "with intent, and on other occasions with negligence" allowed Costello to give false testimony as found by the District Court, and that the fingerprint expert's suppression of evidence was "chargeable under federal law" to Pachtman. In addition Imbler claimed that Pachtman had prosecuted him with knowledge of a lie detector test that had "cleared" Imbler, and that Pachtman had used at trial a police artist's sketch of Hasson's killer made shortly after the crime and allegedly altered to resemble Imbler more closely after the investigation had focused upon him.

Pachtman moved under Fed. Rule Civ. Proc. 12 (b)(6) to have the complaint dismissed as to him. The District Court, noting that public prosecutors repeatedly had been held immune from civil liability for "acts done as part of their traditional official functions," found that Pachtman's alleged acts fell into that category and granted his motion. Following the entry of final judgment as to Pachtman under Fed. Rule Civ. Proc. 54 (b), Imbler appealed to the Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit.

That court, one judge dissenting, affirmed the District Court in an opinion finding Pachtman's alleged acts to have been committed "during prosecutorial activities which can only be characterized as an 'integral part of the judicial process,'" 500 F.2d, at 1302, quoting {*417} Marlowe v. Coakley, 404 F.2d 70 (CA9 1968). We granted certiorari to consider the important and recurring issue of prosecutorial liability under the Civil Rights Act of 1871. 420 U.S. 945 (1975).
II

Title 42 U.S.C. § 1983 provides that "[e]very person" who acts under color of state law to deprive another of a constitutional right shall be answerable to that person in a suit for damages.10 The statute thus creates a species of tort liability that on its face admits of no immunities, and some have argued that it should be applied as stringently as it reads.11 But that view has not prevailed.

This Court first considered the implications of the statute's literal sweep in Tenney v. Brandhove, 341 U.S. 367 (1951). There it was claimed that members of a state legislative committee had called the plaintiff to appear before them, not for a proper legislative purpose, but to intimidate him into silence on certain matters of public concern, and thereby had deprived him of his constitutional rights. Because legislators in both England and this country had enjoyed absolute immunity for their official actions, Tenney squarely presented the issue of whether the Reconstruction Congress had intended to {*418} restrict the availability in § 1983 suits of those immunities which historically, and for reasons of public policy, had been accorded to various categories of officials. The Court concluded that immunities "well grounded in history and reason" had not been abrogated "by covert inclusion in the general language" of § 1983. 341 U.S., at 376. Regardless of any unworthy purpose animating their actions, legislators were held to enjoy under this statute their usual immunity when acting "in a field where legislators traditionally have power to act." Id., at 379.

The decision in Tenney established that § 1983 is to be read in harmony with general principles of tort immunities and defenses rather than in derogation of them. Before today the Court has had occasion to consider the liability of several types of government officials in addition to legislators. The common-law absolute immunity of judges for "acts committed within their judicial jurisdiction," see Bradley v. Fisher, 13 Wall. 335 (1872), was found to be preserved under § 1983 in Pierson v. Ray, 386 U.S. 547, 554-555 (1967).12 In the same case, local police officers sued for a deprivation of liberty resulting from unlawful arrest were held to enjoy under § 1983 a "good faith and probable cause" defense co-extensive with their defense to false arrest actions at {*419} common law. 386 U.S., at 555-557. We found qualified immunities appropriate in two recent cases.13 In Scheuer v. Rhodes, 416 U.S. 232 (1974), we concluded that the Governor and other executive officials of a State had a qualified immunity that varied with "the scope of discretion and responsibilities of the office and all the circumstances as they reasonably appeared at the time of the action...." Id., at 247.14 Last Term in Wood v. Strickland, 420 U.S. 308 (1975), we held that school officials, in the context of imposing disciplinary penalties, were not liable so long as they could not reasonably have known that their action violated students' clearly established constitutional rights, and provided they did not act with malicious intention to cause constitutional or other injury. Id., at 322; cf. O'Connor v. Donaldson, 422 U.S. 563, 577 (1975). In Scheuer and in Wood, as in the two earlier cases, the considerations underlying the nature of the immunity of the respective officials in suits at common law led to essentially the same immunity under § 1983.15 See 420 U.S., at 318-321; 416 U.S., at 239-247, and n. 4.
{*420} III

This case marks our first opportunity to address the § 1983 liability of a state prosecuting officer. The Courts of Appeals, however, have confronted the issue many times and under varying circumstances. Although the precise contours of their holdings have been unclear at times, at bottom they are virtually unanimous that a prosecutor enjoys absolute immunity from § 1983 suits for damages when he acts within the scope of his prosecutorial duties.16 These courts sometimes have described the prosecutor's immunity as a form of "quasi-judicial" immunity and referred to it as derivative of the immunity of judges recognized in Pierson v. Ray, supra.17 Petitioner focuses upon the "quasi-judicial" characterization, and contends that it illustrates a fundamental illogic in according absolute immunity to a prosecutor. He argues that the prosecutor, as a member of the executive branch, cannot claim the immunity reserved for the judiciary, but only a qualified immunity {*421} akin to that accorded other executive officials in this Court's previous cases.

Petitioner takes an overly simplistic approach to the issue of prosecutorial liability. As noted above, our earlier decisions on § 1983 immunities were not products of judicial fiat that officials in different branches of government are differently amenable to suit under § 1983. Rather, each was predicated upon a considered inquiry into the immunity historically accorded the relevant official at common law and the interests behind it. The liability of a state prosecutor under § 1983 must be determined in the same manner.

A
The function of a prosecutor that most often invites a common-law tort action is his decision to initiate a prosecution, as this may lead to a suit for malicious prosecution if the State's case misfires. The first American case to address the question of a prosecutor's amenability to such an action was Griffith v. Slinkard, 146 Ind. 117, 44 N.E. 1001 (1896).18 The complaint charged that a local prosecutor without probable cause added the plaintiff's name to a grand jury true bill after the grand jurors had refused to indict him, with the result that the plaintiff was arrested and forced to appear in court repeatedly before the charge finally was nolle prossed. Despite allegations of malice, the Supreme Court of Indiana dismissed the action on the ground that the prosecutor was absolutely immune. Id., at 122, 44 N.E., at 1002.
{*422}

The Griffith view on prosecutorial immunity became the clear majority rule on the issue.19 The question eventually came to this Court on writ of certiorari to the Court of Appeals for the Second Circuit. In Yaselli v. Goff, 12 F.2d 396 (1926), the claim was that the defendant, a Special Assistant to the Attorney General of the United States, maliciously and without probable cause procured plaintiff's grand jury indictment by the willful introduction of false and misleading evidence. Plaintiff sought some $300,000 in damages for having been subjected to the rigors of a trial in which the court ultimately directed a verdict against the Government. The District Court dismissed the complaint, and the Court of Appeals affirmed. After reviewing the development of the doctrine of prosecutorial immunity, id., at 399-404, that court stated: S

"In our opinion the law requires us to hold that a special assistant to the Attorney General of the United States, in the performance of the duties imposed upon him by law, is immune from a civil action for malicious prosecution based on an indictment and prosecution, although it results in a verdict of not guilty rendered by a jury. The immunity is absolute, and is grounded on principles of public policy." Id., at 406.I

After briefing and oral argument, this Court affirmed the Court of Appeals in a per curiam opinion. Yaselli v. Goff, 275 U.S. 503 (1927).

The common-law immunity of a prosecutor is based upon the same considerations that underlie the common- {*423} law immunities of judges and grand jurors acting within the scope of their duties.20 These include concern that harassment by unfounded litigation would cause a deflection of the prosecutor's energies from his public duties, and the possibility that he would shade his decisions instead of exercising the independence of judgment required by his public trust. One court expressed both considerations as follows: S

"The office of public prosecutor is one which must be administered with courage and independence. Yet how can this be if the prosecutor is made subject to suit by those whom he accuses and fails to convict? To allow this would open the way for unlimited harassment and embarrassment of the most conscientious officials by those who would profit thereby. There would be involved in every case the possible consequences of a failure to obtain a conviction. {*424} There would always be a question of possible civil action in case the prosecutor saw fit to move dismissal of the case.... The apprehension of such consequences would tend toward great uneasiness and toward weakening the fearless and impartial policy which should characterize the administration of this office. The work of the prosecutor would thus be impeded and we would have moved away from the desired objective of stricter and fairer law enforcement." Pearson v. Reed, 6 Cal. App. 2d 277, 287, 44 P. 2d 592, 597 (1935).I
See also Yaselli v. Goff, 12 F.2d, at 404-406.

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