The following actual case cites explain the intrinsic nature and understanding of American judges. Why do American judges act like terrorist dictators? How many lies and contradictions can you find in the following words of the courts?

"The King can do no wrong!"

"Judicial immunity" has been defined as:
"The absolute protection from civil liability arising out of the discharge of judicial functions which every judge enjoys. Under the doctrine of judicial immunity, a judge is not subject to liability for any act committed within the exercise of his judicial function; the immunity is absolute in that it is applicable even if the actions of the judicial officer are taken in bad faith."

Black's Law Dictionary 761 (5th ed. 1979) (citing C.M. Clark Insurance Agency, Inc. v. Reed, 390 F. Supp. 1056 (S.D. Tex. 1975)).

The common law doctrine of judicial immunity that shields judges from civil liability has long been acknowledged. Pickett v. Richardson, 223 Ala. 683, 138 So. 274 (1931); Broom v. Douglass, 175 Ala. 268, 57 So. 860 (1912). The leading modern case on judicial immunity is Stump v. Sparkman, 435 U.S. 349 (1978). In Stump, the plaintiff sued a state judge under 42 U.S.C. § 1983 for approving her sterilization based solely upon her mother's petition. The Supreme Court enunciated a two-part test to determine whether an act was sufficiently "judicial" to warrant immunity.

First, a judge is required to show that the questioned act was performed within his subject matter jurisdiction. Second, the questioned act must have been a judicial function. Immunity will be granted only when the tests for both jurisdiction and judicial function are satisfied. Id. at 360.

Whether an act is judicial is determined by the character of the act and not by the character of the agent. Ex Parte Virginia, 100 U.S. (10 Otto) 339 (1879). Where the law defines and prescribes the duties to be performed by an officer with such precision and certainty as to leave nothing to the exercise of discretion or judgment, the act is characterized as ministerial and not judicial. However, where the act to be done involves the exercise of discretion or judgment, performance of that duty is a judicial act. Grider v. Tally, 77 Ala. 422 (1884); 46 Am.Jur.2d Judges § 83 (1969).

And Judicial Immunity's cousin "Sovereign Immunity"

It is generally agreed that the doctrine of sovereign immunity developed in this country from the English doctrine, which grew out of the concept that the "King can do no wrong." That this occurred in America, given the historical background which led to the Revolutionary War, is "one of the mysteries of legal evolution." Borchard, Government Responsibility in Tort, 34 Yale L.J. 1, 4 (1924).

The concept of municipal immunity from tort claims had its beginning in the English case of Russell v. Men of Devon, 100 Eng.Rep. 359 (1788), which, it has been noted, was 12 years after the Declaration of Independence. Massachusetts is said to be the first state in the United States to adopt the doctrine by judicial decision in Mower v. Inhabitants of Leicester, 9 Mass. 247 (1812).

The rule of governmental immunity for cities, bottomed, as it is, on the English concept that the "King can do no wrong," is the antithesis of the very concepts upon which our government was founded. In fact, recent events have demonstrated dramatically that the "king can do wrong" in America; and when he does, he must pay the penalty for such wrongdoing.

As alluded to earlier, by the turn of the century this judicially created rule of immunity was under severe attack. In fact, England had, by that time, overruled the decision on which the American cases are founded, and municipal immunity for tort is not recognized by the law of England at this time. See Annotation 160 A.L.R. 7.

Most of the words in our revered Declaration of Independence, 200 years old in 1976, catalogue wrongs of the King, and those wrongs were the reasons for the support of our long war for independence from England and the rule and wrongs of the King. Then our own government, first under the Articles of Confederation and later the Constitution of the United States made certain that this new country would have no king.

Our doctrine of governmental immunity, both state and national, grew out of the common sense approach that the people had created a democracy under a republican form of government; that the government was the people, and the people's government should not be weakened by allowing the people to sue themselves when the government committed a tortious act while engaged in a governmental function. In McQuillin, Municipal Corporations, Vol. 18, 3rd Ed.Rev., Section 53.24, pp. 167 et seq., a recognized and oft-quoted authority, states:

"In the absence of statute, it has always been the law that no private action for tort will lie against the state, since negligence cannot be imputed to the sovereign. So, in the various localities or local areas where the state agencies merely perform governmental functions of the state and acquire no individual corporate existence, they stand as the state, and, therefore, to hold them responsible for negligence would be the same as holding the sovereign power answerable for its action. It is assumed that no provate legal duty rests upon a city to perform governmental functions, and, moreover, their character precludes the idea of the common law rule of responsibility, for there is no standard of reasonable care by which the acts of the government may be tested. The state, through its representatives, namely, the municipal corporation, acts in its sovereign capacity, and does not submit its actions to the judgment of the courts.

'The reason is that it is inconsistent with the nature of their powers that they should be compelled to respond to individuals in damages for the manner of their exercise. They are conferred for public purposes, to be exercised in their prescribed limits, at discretion, for the public good; and there can be no appeal from the judgment of the proper municipal authorities to the judgment of courts and juries.

"The doctrine exempting a municipal corporation from private action for torts resulting from the performance of its governmental functions, steadily adhered to by the most recent judicial decisions, as above indicated, is based on the familiar reason that the undertaking is not to promote the private interests of the municipality as a corporate entity, but rather for the public benefit, and in the performance of such obligation the municipality is a mere public agent, either of the state or of the local community.

The reason, as often expressed, is one of public policy, to protect public funds and public property. Taxes are raised for certain specific governmental purposes; and, if they could be diverted to the payment of the damage claims, the more important work of government, which every municipality must perform regardless of its other relations, would be seriously impaired if not totally destroyed. The reason for the exemption is sound and unobjectionable.

In Alabama, the people have tried the doctrine both ways insofar as the State government is concerned. The Constitution of 1819, our first, provided: "The general assembly, shall direct, by law, in what manner, and in what courts, suits may be brought against the State." Statutes were passed in accordance with this provision. Clay's Dig. 339, §§ 143-146. In the Constitutions of 1865 and 1868, the people said "That suits may be brought against the State, in such manner, and in such courts, as may be by law provided." In Ex parte State, 52 Ala. 231 (1875), this court held that since the statutes authorizing suits against the state had been repealed, no such suits could be brought. But in the Constitution of 1875 and our present Constitution of 1901 ( § 14), the people had changed their minds and said, "That the State of Alabama shall never be made a defendant in any court of law or equity." No king or kingly concept had anything to do with those provisions of our Constitution.

Editor's note: The "kingly concept had nothing to do with provisions of our constitution," is such a glaring lie that it must be explained. In 1875, shortly after the War Between the States, the then Attorney General of Alabama SUED the state. That is in effect, Alabama sues Alabama, to obtain an illegal ex-parte Opinion that declared the state could never be made a defendant in any case. From the Attorney General's opinion, evolved the so-called constitutional amendment. No record exist that the people ever voted on this amendment. The Attorney General is a member of the judicial branch of government. The Attorney General's ex-parte "lawsuit against the state," is the classic example of the judicial activism that has eliminated the Separation of Powers Doctrine in the American system of government.

The following actual wording in Ex parte State, 52 Ala. 231 (1875), clearly shows that judicial activism was the origin of "The King can do no Wrong" and extents to the tyrannical Kings of England.

It is said in Bacon's Abridgment, "The king cannot be sued by his subjects by writ, for he cannot issue a command to himself."8 Bac. Ab. 106 "The King," said Chief Justice Markham, to Edward IV, "cannot arrest a man upon suspicion of felony or treason, as any of his subjects may, because if he should wrong a man by such arrest, he can have no remedy against him." 1 Hallam's Const. Hist. 385.

Officers of the state government acting on the basis of an advisory opinion are shielded from liability to the same extent as are those who act pursuant to opinion of the attorney general. Opinion of Justices 410 So. 2d 388 (Ala. 1982).

Code of Alabama, 1975, § 36-15-19. Written opinion; protection from liability.
Statute text
The written opinion of the attorney general, heretofore or hereafter secured by any officer, board, local governing body or agency legally entitled to secure such opinion, shall protect such officer and the members of such board, local governing body or agency to whom it is directed or for whom the same is secured from liability to either the state, county or other municipal subdivisions of the state because of any official act or acts heretofore or hereafter performed as directed or advised in such opinion.

CASE NOTES

General comment.
-- Written opinions of the attorney general are not controlling; they are merely advisory and such opinions operate only to protect the officer to whom it is directed from liability because of any official act performed by such officer as directed or advised in such opinion. Broadfoot v. State, 28 Ala. App. 260, 182 So. 411 (1938).
Authority of attorney general.
-- Written opinions of the attorney general are not controlling; they are merely advisory and, under the statute, such opinions operate only to protect the officer to whom it is directed from liability because of any official act performed by such officer as directed or advised in such opinion. Holcombe v. Mobile County, 26 Ala. App. 151, 155 So. 638 (1934).
Liability.
-- In the absence of express statutory provisions, the liability upon the county cannot be fixed by the opinion of the attorney general or by other construction. Holcombe v. Mobile County, 26 Ala. App. 151, 155 So. 638 (1934).
-- Advice by the Attorney General does not protect an officer of the state against the claims of individuals which result from an erroneous construction of law affecting his duties, but when such a controversy arises between him and an individual the Declaratory Judgments Act furnishes the remedy for or against him. Curry v. Woodstock Slag Corp. 6 So. 2d 479 (1942).
Cited in Gray v. Main 309 F. Supp. 207 (M.D. Ala. 1968); Hunt v. Tucker 875 F. Supp. 1487 (N.D. Ala. 1995).

Editor's Note: The Declaratory Judgments Act eliminates the right to a trial by jury.

"Because the corporation is, as to the passage of the ordinances and the appointment of the officer described in the pleadings, a government, exercising political power, it is irresponsible for the official misconduct alleged, upon the same principle which generally protects governments and public officers from liability for the misfeasances and malfeasances of persons necessarily employed under them in the public service. - Story on Agency, §§ 319, 319 a, 319 b, 320, 321; Dunlap's Paley's Agency, 376.

Municipal corporations, quoad hoc, stand upon the same foundation with public officers, counties, townships, and other quasi corporations, charged with some public duty, or invested with some portion of the authority of the government, where the employment of officers is necessary and lawful." So it can be seen that the common-law rule of governmental immunity was in effect before any provisions were placed in the Constitution.

"This is no outmoded theory that 'the King can do no wrong. It is merely a recognition that in a government of the people, by the people, and for the people, the wrongs inflicted by government upon the people are wrongs they inflict upon themselves.